This paper considers the problem of cooperative data exchange with selfish users. In this setting, each user has a subset of packets in the ground set X, and wants all other packets in X. The users can exchange coded combinations of their packets over a lossless broadcast channel, and monetary transactions are allowed between any pair of users. We define the utility of each user as the sum of two functions: (i) the difference between the total payment received by the user and the total transmission rate of the user, and (ii) the difference between the total number of required packets by the user and the total payment made by the user. A rate-vector and paymentmatrix pair (r, p) is said to stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users) if (r, p) is Pareto optimal over all minor coalitions (i.e., all proper subsets of users who collectively know all packets in X). Our goal is to design a stabilizing ratepayment pair with minimum sum-rate and minimum sumpayment for any given problem instance. In this work, we show that such a solution always exists, and we propose two algorithms to find such a solution. Moreover, we show that both algorithms maximize the sum utility of all users, while one also maximizes the minimum utility among all users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several variants of the cooperative data exchange (CDE) problem have been previously studied in the literature, see, e.g., [1] - [11] . The original setting of this problem considers a peer-to-peer data exchange scenario over a lossless broadcast channel. There is a group N of users and a ground set X of packets. Each user knows a subset of packets in X, and wants to learn the rest of packets in X. The users exchange their packets by broadcasting coded combinations of their packets, and the problem is to find a solution (i.e., the number as well as the set of packets transmitted by each user) such that all users achieve omniscience (i.e., are able to decode all packets in X) with minimum total sum-rate.
In this work, we approach the CDE problem from a game-theoretic perspective where all users are selfish. In our setting, there can be a monetary transaction between any pair of users, and the utility function of each user is defined as the sum of two sub-utility functions as follows: (i) the difference between the total payment the user receives from other users and its transmission rate (total number of packets that it transmits), and (ii) the difference between the total number of packets the user wants and the total payment it makes to other users. Thinking of the sum of the transmission rate and the total payment being made by each user as its cost for participating in the exchange session, and thinking of the sum of the number of packets each user receives and the total payment being received by the user as its gain due to its participation in the exchange session, the utility function of each user is the difference between its cost and its gain.
Let r i , the transmission rate of user i, be the total number of transmissions made by user i per exchange session, and p i,j be the total payment made by user i to user j. The problem is to find a rate schedule {r i } i∈N and a payment schedule {p i,j } i,j∈N for the grand coalition (i.e., the set of all users) to achieve omniscience all together that is Pareto optimal with respect to the utility function, over all minor coalitions (i.e., any proper subset of users who collectively know all packets in X). That is, a pair
for any minor coalition S to achieve omniscience together such that the utility of some user(s) in S is strictly greater, and the utility of no user in S is less. The goal is to find (if exists) a stabilizing solution that minimizes the sum-rate and the sum-payment simultaneously. Unlike a traditional cooperative game, our goal is not the allocation of value that results from the coalition formation. Rather, our objective is to ensure that any subset of users achieve omniscience with as few transmissions or payments as possible.
In this work, we propose two algorithms, each of which finds a solution that guarantees stability of the grand coalition for any problem instance. Both algorithms maximize the sum utility of all users, ensuring maximum social welfare, while one also maximizes the minimum utility among all users.
A. Related Work
A coalition-game model for the CDE problem was recently proposed in [12] . This model differs from our work in two aspects: (i) the utility function is different from ours, and (ii) the criteria for the stability of the grand coalition is different from the Pareto optimality being considered here.
Recently, in [13] , we also studied a related problem, where each user has two utility functions: its rate and its delay. Defining the stability of the grand coalition via the Pareto optimality with respect to both the rate and delay functions simultaneously, over all minor coalitions, we showed that there does not exist any non-monetary mechanism (without the peer-to-peer payments) that stabilizes the grand coalition for all problem instances. This result is the motivation of this work on the design of a monetary mechanism for stabilizing the grand coalition for any problem instance.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the original setting of the cooperative data exchange (CDE) problem as follows. Consider a group of n users and a set of k packets X {x 1 , . . . , x k }. Let N {1, . . . , n} and K {1, . . . , k}. Initially, each user i ∈ N has a subset X i of the packets in X, and ultimately, the user i wants the rest of the packets X i X \ X i . The index set of packets in X i for each user i is known by all other users. Also, without loss of generality, we assume that X = ∪ i∈N X i . The objective of all users is to achieve omniscience, i.e., to learn all packets in X, via exchanging their packets by broadcasting (coded or uncoded) packets.
A subset S of users in N is a coalition if ∪ i∈S X i = X. We refer to any coalition S ⊂ N as a minor coalition, and refer to the coalition N as the grand coalition. Whenever we use the notation S for a subset of users, we assume that S is a coalition. Let Z + be the set of non-negative integers. For any S ⊆ N , a rate vector r [r 1 , . . . , r n ] ∈ Z n + is S-omniscience-achieving if there exists a transmission scheme with each user i ∈ S transmitting r i (coded or uncoded) packets such that all users in S achieve omniscience, regardless of transmissions of the rest of the users. Note that, for any S-omniscience-achieving rate vector, random linear network coding (over a sufficiently large finite field) suffices as a transmission scheme for all users in S to achieve omniscience (with any arbitrarily high probability) [8] . For any S ⊆ N , we denote by R S the set of all S-omniscienceachieving rate vectors r such that r i = 0 for all i ∈ S. For any arbitrary subset S ⊆ N and any rate vector r, we define the sum-rate r S i∈S r i and r ∅ 0. By a standard network coding argument [8] , for any S ⊆ N , r ∈ R S iff rS ≥ |∩ j∈S\S X j |, for every (non-empty)S ⊂ S.
We consider CDE under a monetary mechanism where there can be a payment from any user to any other user. For all i, j ∈ N , let p i,j ≥ 0 be the total payment from the user i to the user j, and let p i,i = 0. For a payment matrix p [p i,j ], let p + i j∈N p j,i and p − i j∈N p i,j be the total incoming and total outgoing payments of the user i, respectively. For any S ⊆ N , we denote by P S the set of all payment matrices p such that p i,j = 0 and p j,i = 0 for all i ∈ S, j ∈ S, i.e., there is no incoming/outgoing payment to/from any user in S from/to any user out of S. For any S ⊆ N , we define the sum-payment p S i,j∈S p i,j . Note that i∈S p + i = i∈S p − i = p S for all p ∈ P S . Definition 1 (Utility). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ R S , and any p ∈ P S , the utility of each user i ∈ S is given by
where p + i − r i is the net utility accrued by user i due to its contribution to the system, and |X i |−p − i is the net utility accrued by user i due to the system's contribution to it.
According to the definition, the cost per transmission and the value per packet are equal. However, we desire a notion of rational behavior that does not depend on the ratio of these two quantities, since they could be very different for different
Have the user t transmit the packet
communication technologies and content files. Hence, we choose a notion of rationality that compares the cost of transmissions with incoming payments, and the value of omniscience with the amount paid out.
Definition 2 (Rationality). For any S ⊆ N , any r ∈ R S and any p ∈ P S , the rate-payment pair (r, p) is rational if
Hereafter, we focus on the rational rate-payment pairs only, and omit the term "rational" for brevity.
All users are assumed to be selfish, i.e., each user may or may not agree with its rate specified by a rate vector or its payments specified by a payment matrix. We wish to find a rate-payment pair (r, p), r ∈ R N and p ∈ P N , under which N is stable. The notion of stability is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Stability). For any pair (r, p), r ∈ R N and p ∈ P N , N is (r, p)-stable if there is no pair (r,p),r ∈ R S , andp ∈ P S , for some S ⊂ N , such that
The (r, p)-stability of the grand coalition is equivalent to the Pareto optimality of (r, p) over all minor coalitions.
Note that a feasible solution guarantees that no subset of users have incentive to break away from the grand coalition.
Note that, for an optimal solution, the sum-rate and the sum-payment are minimum among all feasible solutions.
The goal is to find (if exists) an optimal solution for any given instance of the problem.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS

A. Algorithm 1
In this section, we present an algorithm that, for any given instance, finds an optimal solution.
The algorithm begins with an all-zero rate vector r = [r i ] i∈N and an all-zero payment matrix p = [p i,j ] i,j∈N , operates in rounds, and updates r and p over the rounds.
For any (uncoded) packet
. Let U i be the set of (unit) encoding vectors of packets in X i , and V l be the set of encoding vectors of all packets being transmitted by the end of the round l. Let V 0 ∅. We refer to span(U i ∪ V l ) and dim(U i ∪ V l ) as the knowledge set and the size of knowledge set of the user i at the end of the round l, respectively, where span(V) and dim(V) denote the vector space of (linear) span (over F q ) of a collection V of vectors in F k q and the dimension of span(V), respectively. Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let T l be the set of all users i with maximum dim(U i ∪ V l−1 ). In the round l, the algorithm first selects an arbitrary user t ∈ T l , and then the user t constructs (using its uncoded packets) and broadcasts a (coded) packet y l (with encoding vector v l ).
Let R l be the set of all users i such that U t ⊆ span(U i ∪ V l−1 ). The encoding vector v l of the packet y l satisfies two conditions:
. (Such a vector v l ∈ F k q always exists and it can be found in polynomial time using a randomized or a deterministic algorithm so long as q ≥ n · k or q ≥ n, respectively [4] .) Note that R l is the set of all users i whose knowledge set at the beginning of the round l is not a superset of (initial) knowledge set of the transmitting user t, and the encoding vector v l of the packet y l being transmitted by the user t in the round l is not known to any user i ∈ R l at the beginning of the round l. Thus, the transmission of the packet y l increases the size of knowledge set of any user i ∈ R l by one, and it does not change that of any user i ∈ R l .
Next, the algorithm increments r t by 1 and increments p i,t by 1/|R l | for all i ∈ R l . At the end of the round l, the algorithm augments V l−1 by v l , and constructs V l , i.e., V l = V l−1 ∪{v l }. The rounds continue until the size of knowledge set of all users is k. Once the algorithm terminates, it returns the rate vector r and the payment matrix p. 
B. Algorithm 2
In this section, we present an algorithm that for any given instance provides an optimal solution with maximum sumutility and maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions. Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1, and the only difference is in the set of users that make payments and the update rule of the payments in each round. We assume that there is a broker that collects the payment p − i by each user i, and returns the payment p + i to each user i.
Select an arbitrary user t ∈ T l
The algorithm begins with all-zero payment vectors p + and p − , and updates these vectors over the rounds as follows.
Consider an arbitrary round l > 0. Let P l be the set of users with maximum |X i |−p − i . Assuming that the user t transmits in the round l, the algorithm increments p + t by 1 and increments p − i by 1/|P l | for all i ∈ P l . Theorem 2. The output of Algorithm 2 is optimal. Moreover, the output of Algorithm 2 has maximum sum-utility and maximum min-utility among all optimal solutions.
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS A. Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, r and p denote the outputs of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. (r, p) is rational.
Proof: The proof can be found in [14] .
Let N s be the sth subset of users that achieve omniscience simultaneously, and let l s be the round at which the users in N s achieve omniscience. Note that the sets N s are disjoint. Denote by N (s) the set of all users in N 1 , . . . , N s . Let m be such that N (m) = N . The following result can be shown. Proof: The proof can be found in [14] . Proof: The proof follows by contradiction. Suppose that (r, p) is not feasible (i.e., N is not (r, p)-stable). Thus, there existsr ∈ R S andp ∈ P S for some S ⊂ N such that u i (r, p) ≤ u i (r,p) for all i ∈ S, and u i (r, p) < u i (r,p) for some i ∈ S. Thus, i∈S u i (r,p) > i∈S u i (r, p).
Note that
Putting these arguments together, we have (i) i∈S p − i > i∈Sr i . Let s ∈ [m] be such that S ⊆ N (s) and S ∩ N s = ∅. All users in S achieve omniscience by the round l s . By the structure of the proposed algorithm, one unit of payment is made in each round (each user in R l pays 1/|R l | units of payment in the round l), and no user pays in any round after it achieves omniscience (if the user i is complete at the beginning of the round l, then i ∈ R l ). Thus, we have i∈S p − i ≤ l s . Moreover, by Lemma 2, l s ≤ i∈Sr i , for allr ∈ R S . By combining these two inequalities, we get (ii) i∈S p − i ≤ i∈Sr i . Comparing (i) and (ii), we arrive at a contradiction, and so, N is (r, p)-stable.
Lemma 4 ( [4]
). For anyr ∈ R N , we haver N ≥ r N .
Proof: The proof can be found in [4] . Proof: Consider an arbitrary feasible (r,p),r ∈ R N and p ∈ P N . We shall show thatr N ≥ r N andp N ≥ p N . By Lemma 4,r N ≥ r N for allr ∈ R N . Since (r,p) is feasible, then (r,p) is rational. Thus,p + i ≥r i for all i ∈ N , and consequently,p N ≥r N . Note that p N = r N since p + i = r i . Thus,p N ≥r N ≥ r N = p N . This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, r and p denote the outputs of Algorithm 2. Lemma 6. (r, p) is rational.
Proof: Let r i (l), p + i (l), and p − i (l) be r i , p + i , and p − i at the end of the round l − 1, respectively. Note that r i = r i (l m + 1), p + i = p + i (l m + 1), and p − i = p − i (l m + 1). We will show that p + i (l) ≥ r i (l) and |X i |≥ p − i (l) for all i ∈ N and all l ∈ [l m + 1]. Fix an arbitrary l ∈ [l m + 1]. By the procedure of Algorithm 2, p + i (l) = r i (l), and particularly,
By the procedure of Algorithm 2, |X i |+p − i (l) are the same for all i such that p − i (l) > 0, and |X i |+p − i (l) = |X i |≤ k for all i such that p − i (l) = 0. Since |X i |+p − i (l) > k for some i (by assumption), then |X i |+p − i (l) > k for all i, and consequently, p − i (l) > 0 for all i (since |X i |≤ k for all i). Since p − i (l) is non-decreasing in l for all i, then |X i |+p − i > k for all i, or equivalently, p − i > |X i | for all i. Thus, i∈N p − i > i∈N |X i |, and consequently, r N > i∈N |X i | since i∈N p − i = i∈N p + i = r N . This is, however, a contradiction since r N ≤ min i∈N |X i |+ max i∈N |X i | (by the result of [2, Lemma 3]), and consequently, r N ≤ i∈N |X i |. Thus, |X i |≥ p − i (l) for all i and all l, and particularly, |X i |≥ p − i for all i. This completes the proof. Proof: Take an arbitrary S such that R S = ∅ (i.e., all users in S can achieve omniscience together). By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3, it suffices to show that i∈S p − i ≤r S for allr ∈ R S . Run Algorithm 2 over the set S, and denote by (r,p) the output. LetỸ = {ỹ 1 , . . . ,ỹr S } andṼ = {ṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽr S } be the set of all packets being transmitted from the round 1 to the roundr S and their encoding vectors, respectively. Note thatr S is the minimum sum-rate that all users in S can achieve omniscience (by Lemma 4). Assume, without loss of generality, that |X 1 |≤ |X 2 |≤ . . . ≤ |X n |. Define i min i∈S i, and S {i , . . . , n}. Since S ⊆ S , then R S = ∅ (i.e., all users in S can achieve omniscience together). Moreover, run Algorithm 2 over the set S , and denote by (r , p ) the output. Note that p S = r S (by the result of Lemma 6). Let Y = {y 1 , . . . , y r S } and V = {v 1 , . . . , v r S } be the set of all packets being transmitted from the round 1 to the round r S and their encoding vectors, respectively.
First, we show that r S ≤r S . To do so, it suffices to show that all users in S \S achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets inỸ . The proof follows by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary user i ∈ S \ S. Suppose that the user i does not achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets inỸ , i.e., dim(
Thus, there exists some round l such that the encoding vector v l of the packetỹ l being transmitted by some user t ∈ S is in the knowledge set of the user i prior to the round l, i.e., span(U t ) ⊆ span(U i ∪ {ṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ l−1 }), and consequently, span(U t ∪ {ṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ l−1 }) ⊆ span(U i ∪ {ṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ l−1 }). Thus, span(U t ∪Ṽ ) ⊆ span(U i ∪Ṽ ). Since dim(U t ∪Ṽ ) = k and dim(U i ∪Ṽ ) ≥ dim(U t ∪Ṽ ), then dim(U i ∪Ṽ ) = k. This is, however, a contradiction since dim(U i ∪Ṽ ) < k (by assumption). Thus, all users in S \ S achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets inỸ , and so, r S ≤r S .
Next, we show that i∈S p − i ≤ p S . If S = N , then i∈S p − i = p N = r N = r N = p N = p S . Now assume that S = N . If for some l, the packet y l being transmitted by the user t ∈ S does not increase the size of knowledge set of the user i ∈ N \ S such that dim(
This yields a contradiction since dim(U i ∪V ) < k (by assumption). Thus, the packet y l (for any l) increases the size of knowledge set of all users in N \ S that do not achieve omniscience after the reception of all packets y 1 , . . . , y r S . Since after the reception of all packets in Y the size of knowledge set of each user i ∈ N \S is min{|X i |+r S , k}, then the user i needs k − min{|X i |+r S , k} (≤ k − min{|X 1 |+r S , k}) more packets to achieve omniscience. Thus, if the users in S continue their transmissions after they all achieve omniscience, all users in N \ S achieve omniscience after the reception of at most k − min{|X 1 |+r S , k} more packets. Thus, all users in N achieve omniscience with at most r S + k − min{|X 1 |+r S , k} total transmissions. Since r N is the minimum sum-rate for all users in N to achieve omniscience, then r S + k − min{|X 1 |+r S , k} ≥ r N . We consider two cases: (i) |X 1 |+r S ≥ k, and (ii) |X 1 |+r S < k.
In the case (i), r S ≥ r N = p N ≥ i∈S p − i . In the case (ii), r S + k − |X 1 |−r S = k − |X 1 |≥ r N . Since r N ≥ k − |X 1 | (otherwise, the user 1 cannot achieve omniscience),
by definition). By combining the above arguments, it then follows that i∈S p − i ≤r S , as was to be shown. Lemma 8. (r, p) is optimal.
Proof: The proof simply follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5, and hence omitted to avoid repetition.
Lemma 9. For any optimal (r,p), we have i∈N u i (r, p) = i∈N u i (r,p) and min i∈N u i (r, p) ≥ min i∈N u i (r,p). Proof: The proof of the first part (i.e., maximum sumutility) is straightforward. Take an arbitrary optimal (r,p). Sincer N = r N and p,p ∈ P N , then
For the proof of the second part (i.e., maximum min-utility), we need to show that min i∈N u i (r,p) ≤ min i∈N u i (r, p) for any optimal (r,p). Take an arbitrary optimal (r,p). Sincep + i =r i (otherwise,p N > r N = p N sincep + i ≥r i (by rationality of (r,p)), and so, (r,p) cannot be optimal), then u i (r,p) = |X i |−p − i . Note thatp N = p N . Let c min i∈N (|X i |+p − i ). Note that |X i |−p − i = k − c if c ≥ |X i |, and |X i |−p − i = |X i |= k − |X i | if c < |X i |. Thus, u i (r, p) = k − max{c, |X i |} for all i ∈ N . Since |X n |≥ |X i | for all i ∈ N (by assumption), it then follows that min i∈N u i (r, p) = k − max{c, |X n |}. We consider two cases: (i) c < |X n |, and (ii) c ≥ |X n |.
In the case (i), min i∈N u i (r, p) = k − |X n |= |X n |. Ifp − n > 0, then u n (r,p) = |X n |−p − n < |X n |= min i∈N u i (r, p). Ifp − n = 0, then u n (r,p) = |X n |, and consequently, min i∈N u i (r,p) ≤ u n (r,p) = min i∈N u i (r, p) = k − c. In the case (ii), min i∈N u i (r, p) = k − c. Suppose that min i∈N u i (r,p) > min i∈N u i (r, p). Let j ∈ N be such that |X j |−p − j = min i∈N u i (r,p). Thus,
i∈N |X i |−r N > nk − nc, or equivalently, ( i∈N |X i |+r N )/n < c. Since c = min i∈N (|X i |+p − i ) (by definition) and c ≥ |X n | (by assumption), then it is easy to see that c = ( i∈N |X i |+r N )/n. This is a contradiction since ( i∈N |X i |+r N )/n < c. Thus, min i∈N u i (r,p) ≤ min i∈N u i (r, p). This completes the proof.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of peer-to-peer data exchange in a lossless broadcast setting. Our goal was to ensure stability of the grand coalition under which it is guaranteed that all users obtain complete information at the end of the exchange process, with there being no incentive for any subset of users to break away on their own. The key novelty of our framework was the design of monetary mechanisms that not only ensure stability, but also maximize the social good of the system as a whole.
